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The disclosure of leniency Statements and other Evidence 
under directive 2014/104/EU: an Undue Prominence of 
Public Enforcement?
Claudia Massa*
aBStraCt: directive 2014/104/EU contains detailed provisions related to the dis-
closure of evidence in actions for damages before national courts that seek to strike a 
balance between a claimant’s right to access evidence in support of its private damages 
claim and the protection of leniency programmes, which are some of the main tools 
of public antitrust enforcement. articles 5 to 8 of the directive create a “microsystem” 
of the law of the evidences, which is highly specialised and based on the central role of 
the judge and on the principle that private enforcement must not compromise public 
enforcement. 
The directive tackles the information asymmetry that characterises competition law 
litigation by acknowledging the right for a claimant “to obtain the disclosure of evi-
dence relevant to their claim, without it being necessary for them to specify individual 
items of evidence”. However, the obtainment of the disclosure of evidence is circum-
scribed by a number of conditions and exceptions.
The directive creates three lists of documents that are characterised by a different level 
of protection: the black list, the grey list and the white list. 
after giving an overview of all these provisions, the article will focus on the disclosure 
of leniency statements and settlement submissions, by analysing the case law of the 
ECJ before and after the entry into force of the directive. it will be found out that while 
the Court has always been cautious, by affirming that it is necessary to weigh up, on a 
case-by-case basis, the respective interests in favour of disclosure of such documents 
and those in favour of their protection, the European legislator preferred to uncondi-
tionally protect the efficiency of leniency and settlement programmes to the detriment 
of parties that suffered a harm, which have to find any possible way to support their 
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damage claim in a context in which the information asymmetry and the difficulty of 
the factual and economic analysis are evident. 
it seems that, with article 6(6), the European legislator did not succeed in its goal of 
making it easier for victims of antitrust violations to claim compensation from the 
offender, which is the general aim of the directive. in fact, not having the possibility to 
have access to leniency statements or settlement submissions in stand-alone actions, 
it is highly difficult to prove that they suffered harm. Therefore, victims can only wait 
until the competition authority adopts a final infringement decision in order to start a 
probably successful follow-on action. 
overall, all provisions on disclosure of documents contained in the directive con-
tribute to make a big step forward in the private enforcement sector, except for the 
provisions of article 6(6), which could have probably been less rigid. in fact, while 
the rule on the right to obtain the disclosure of evidence, together with the provisions 
on disclosure of documents contained in the grey list and in the white list, strike a 
fair balance between public and private enforcement and facilitate victims of antitrust 
violations in bringing actions for damages, the same thing cannot be affirmed for 
provisions on disclosure of documents contained in the black list.
KEYWordS: private enforcement, damages actions, disclosure of evidence, leniency 
statements, case law.
Introduction
on 26 November 2014, the European Parliament and the Council adopted 
directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union (the so-called “damages 
directive”).1 Member States had to implement the damages directive in 
their legal systems by 27 december 2016.2
1 directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competi-
tion law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, oJ l 349, 5.12.2014, 1-19.
2 However, so far, only twenty Member States have communicated to the Commission the meas-
ures through which they have fully transposed it (last updated on 14 June 2017, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html). Moreover, the directive 
has to be transposed also in the EEa EFta States (iceland, liechtenstein and Norway) since 
it is EEa-relevant. in order to do so, it needs to be implemented into the EEa agreement (the 
agreement on the European Economic area, which entered into force on 1 January 1994) before 
the EEa EFta States can adopt the relevant national measures. in fact, according to article 102(1) 
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This directive tends to harmonise the rules governing actions for dam-
ages for infringements of EU or national competition law, in order to 
facilitate victims of antitrust violations to claim compensation from the 
offender.3 in particular, it pursues the objective of improving the enforce-
ment of competition law both at a public and at a private level. 
For this reason, it contains, among the others, detailed provisions 
related to the disclosure of evidence in actions for damages before national 
courts that seek to strike a balance between a claimant’s right to access 
evidence in support of its private damages claim and the protection of 
leniency programmes, which are some of the main tools of public anti-
trust enforcement. articles 5 to 8 of the directive create a “microsystem” 
of the law of the evidences, which is highly specialised and which is based 
on the central role of the judge (recital No. 24 et seq.) and on the prin-
ciple that private enforcement must not compromise public enforcement 
(recital No. 21).4 
This contribution seeks to analyse the directive’s provisions on the dis-
closure of evidence, and then it focuses on the disclosure of leniency state-
ments and settlement submissions, with particular regard to the rulings 
of the European Court of Justice delivered before and after the entry into 
force of the directive. 
1. The Damages Directive’s provisions on the disclosure of evidence
1.1. The right to obtain the disclosure
actions for damages for infringements of Union or national competition 
law typically require a complex factual and economic analysis. The evi-
dence necessary to prove a claim for damages is often held exclusively by 
the opposing party or by third parties, and is not sufficiently known by, or 
EEa, whenever an EEa-relevant EU legal act is amended, or a new act adopted, a corresponding 
amendment should be made to the relevant annex to the EEa agreement.
3 The ECJ recognised for the first time the individual’s right to seek compensation for the harm 
caused to them by an infringement of articles 101 and 102 tFEU in the judgment of 20 September 
2001, Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd and Others, Case C-453/99, 
EU:C:2001:465.
4 Cf. Gabriella Muscolo, “l’accesso alla prova e lo standard probatorio”, http://www.agcm.it/com-
ponent/joomdoc/eventi/convegni/Muscolo_-_laccesso_alla_prova_e_lo_standard_probatorio.
pdf/download.html.
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accessible to, the claimant.5 For these reasons, the number of actions for 
antitrust damages is still rather low.6 
The damages directive tackles the information asymmetry that charac-
terises competition law litigation by acknowledging the right for a claim-
ant “to obtain the disclosure of evidence relevant to their claim, without it 
being necessary for them to specify individual items of evidence” (recital 
No. 15). in fact, since the evidence is an important element for bring-
ing actions for damages for infringement of competition law, strict legal 
requirements for claimants to assert in detail all the facts of their case at 
the beginning of an action and to proffer precisely specified items of sup-
porting evidence should be avoided because they can unduly impede the 
effective exercise of the right to compensation guaranteed by the tFEU. 
However, the obtainment of the disclosure of evidence is circumscribed 
by a number of conditions and exceptions.
First of all, the claimant must present a reasoned justification containing 
reasonably available facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility 
of its claim for damages (article 5(1)). Thus, disclosure can only be ordered 
if the claimant has made a plausible assertion, on the basis of facts reason-
ably available to him, that he has suffered harm as a result of an infringe-
ment of competition rules by the defendant. The claimant does not have 
to specify individual items of evidence but he is under a duty to specify 
items or categories of evidence “as precisely and as narrowly as possible” 
(article 5(2)). The damages directive provides that “fishing expeditions”, 
i.e. non-specific or overly broad disclosure requests, should be prevented. 
Therefore, requests for the general disclosure of documents in a competi-
tion authority’s file or of documents submitted by the defendant in the 
administrative procedure would not be permissible under article 5(2) of 
the damages directive.
5 on the difficulty in obtaining access to evidence, see alessandro Bernes, “la prova del danno e 
del nesso di causalità nell’azione risarcitoria derivante da ‘cartello’ in seguito al recepimento della 
direttiva 2014/104/UE”, Responsabilita’ Civile e Previdenza 82, no. 3 (2017): 954.
6 Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Jakob ruggeberg, “Consolidating antitrust damages in Europe: a 
proposal for standing in line with efficient private enforcement”, World Competition: Law and 
Economics Review 29, 3 (2006): 395; aldo Frignani, “l’onere della prova nelle cause risarcitorie 
da illecito antitrust”, Diritto ed Economia dell’Assicurazione, no. 4 (2011): 1332; Gian antonio 
Benacchio, “il private enforcement del diritto europeo antitrust: Evoluzione e risultati”, in 
Dizionario Sistematico del Diritto della Concorrenza, ed. lorenzo F. Pace (Naples: Jovene Editore, 
2013), 16; Gabriella Muscolo, “alcune questioni in tema di accesso alla prova nel processo anti-
trust”, in Concorrenza ed Effettività della Tutela Giurisdizionale tra Ordinamento dell’Unione 
Europea e Ordinamento Italiano, ed. Giuseppe tesauro (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2013), 209.
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Secondly, the national court has to order the disclosure of evidence only 
to the extent that disclosure would be proportionate, taking into account: 
“a) the extent to which the claim or defence is supported by available facts 
and evidence justifying the request to disclose evidence; b) the scope and 
cost of disclosure, especially for any third parties concerned, including 
preventing non-specific searches for information which is unlikely to be of 
relevance for the parties in the procedure; and c) whether the evidence the 
disclosure of which is sought contains confidential information, especially 
concerning any third parties, and what arrangements are in place for pro-
tecting such confidential information” (article 5(3) letters a) to c)).
Thirdly, where national courts order evidence that is included in the file 
of a competition authority, i.e. the Commission’s or a national competi-
tion authority’s administrative file, specific rules apply that seek to protect 
certain categories of information from disclosure.
1.2. The protection of specific categories of evidence 
The damages directive provides for an increased level of protection for 
certain categories of documents. in particular, as far as evidence included 
in the file of a competition authority is concerned, in addition to the 
proportionality requirement set out in article 5(3), its disclosure has to 
comply with article 6(4). The latter stipulates that when assessing the pro-
portionality of an order for disclosure of evidence that is in the file of a 
competition authority, the national court must consider three more fac-
tors: a) “whether the request has been formulated specifically with regard 
to the nature, subject matter or contents of documents submitted to a com-
petition authority or held in the file thereof, rather than by a non-specific 
application concerning documents submitted to a competition authority”; 
b) whether the request relates to an action for damages before a national 
court; and c) the need to safeguard the effectiveness of the public enforce-
ment of competition law (article 6(4) letters a) to c)).
1.3. The black list: absolute exemption from disclosure
article 6(6) of the damages directive establishes a “black list” of docu-
ments that benefit from an absolute exemption from disclosure: leniency 
statements and settlement submissions. National courts cannot order dis-
closure of these materials at any point in time. leniency statements only 
comprise the corporate statements, which are the oral or written informa-
tion provided voluntarily by, or on behalf of, an undertaking or natural 
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person to the competition authority specifically for the purpose of obtain-
ing immunity or a reduction of fines under the Commission’s or a national 
competition authority’s leniency programme. as for pre-existing informa-
tion, which consists in information that exists irrespective of the proceed-
ings of a competition authority, it is not protected by the absolute ban of 
disclosure (recital No. 28). However, the exemption from disclosure is 
extended to literal quotations of a leniency statement or a settlement sub-
mission in other documents (recital No. 26).
These provisions are added to three pieces of legislation having regard to 
the disclosure of these kinds of evidence that were in force already before 
the entry into force of the damages directive: regulation 1049/2001,7 
regulation 1/20038 and regulation 773/2004.9 
Historically, claimants sought access to evidence from defendants before 
national courts and/or from the Commission on the basis of regulation 
1049/2001. in fact, all documents of EU institutions are open to public 
access under article 15 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (tFEU) and under regulation 1049/2001. There are, however, excep-
tions to this general right of public access: for instance, the Commission 
may refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the 
protection of commercial interests or the purpose of inspections, unless 
there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.10 Even though the 
transparency regulation applies to all areas of law and all documents, 
7 regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, oJ l 145, 
31.5.2001, 43-48.
8 Council regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 december 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the treaty, oJ l 001, 04.01.2003, 0001-0025.
9 Commission regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 of 7 april 2004 relating to the conduct of proceed-
ings by the Commission pursuant to articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty, oJ l 123, 27.4.2004, 18-24. 
on 3 august 2015, the European Commission adopted amendments to regulation 773/2004 and 
four related Notices (access to the File, leniency, Settlements, Cooperation with National Courts), 
aimed at aligning them with directive 2014/104/EU.
10 See article 15(4) tFEU as well as article 4 of regulation 1049/2001. Such exceptions may be 
grouped into mandatory exceptions and discretionary exceptions. a mandatory exception pre-
cludes access regardless of any other interest advocating disclosure such as public security or pri-
vacy and the integrity of the individual (article 4(1) of regulation 1049/2001). in contrast, a discre-
tionary exception requires a balancing of the interests for and against disclosure: EU institutions 
shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial 
interests of natural or legal persons, court proceedings and legal advice, or the purpose of inspec-
tions, investigations and audits, unless in each of these cases there is an “overriding public interest 
in disclosure” (article 4(2) of regulation 1049/2001).
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many requests concern antitrust cases.11 in antitrust cases, the Commission 
generally rejects applications for access to evidence by invoking either the 
exception for the protection of the commercial interests of third parties or 
the exception for the protection of the purpose of investigations.12
Under article 30 of regulation 1/2003, instead, damage claimants can 
obtain information in final decisions concluding the enforcement pro-
ceedings, which the Commission must publish on its website. The non-
confidential version of the Commission decision does not include certain 
information such as business secrets, specific references to leniency sub-
missions, and other information covered by the principle of the presump-
tion of innocence. Thus, there are cases where damage claimants seek to 
obtain the confidential version of the Commission decision through other 
channels.13 
lastly, regulation 773/2004 lays down restrictive rules for the use of 
documents in the file relating to a proceeding under article 101 tFEU, by 
confining access to the file to the parties concerned and to complainants 
whose complaints the Commission intends to reject, subject to the protec-
tion of the business secrets and other confidential information of under-
takings and internal documents of the Commission and of the national 
competition authorities, and provided that the documents made available 
are used only for the purposes of judicial or administrative proceedings for 
the application of article 101 tFEU.14
1.4. The grey list: temporary exemption from disclosure
article 6(5) contains the “grey list”, that is a list of categories of evidence 
that can be disclosed only after a competition authority has closed its pro-
ceedings by adopting a decision or otherwise.15 in particular, the directive 
11 approximately 9 per cent. report from the Commission on the application in 2010 of regulation 
(EC) No. 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents, available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/lexUriServ/lexUriServ.do?uri=CoM:2011:0492
:FiN:EN:PdF.
12 Gianni de Stefano, “access of damage claimants to evidence arising out of EU cartel investiga-
tions: a fast-evolving scenario”, Global Competition Litigation Review 5, no. 3 (2012), 98.
13 Gianni de Stefano, “access of damage claimants to evidence arising out of EU cartel investiga-
tions: a fast-evolving scenario”, Global Competition Litigation Review 5, no. 3 (2012), 96.
14 See articles 6, 8, 15 and 16 of regulation 773/2004. 
15 interestingly, in italy, article 4(8) of the legislative decree No. 3/2017 transposing the damages 
directive into national legislation provides for a rule which was not included in the directive: 
with regard to the categories of evidence contained in the grey list, it introduces the possibility for 
the national court to suspend the civil proceeding until the competition authority has closed its 
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refers to: information that was prepared by a party specifically for the 
proceedings of a competition authority (e.g., a party’s responses to data 
requests or replies to a Statement of objections or letter of Facts), infor-
mation that the competition authority has drawn up and sent to the parties 
in the course of the proceedings (e.g., the Statement of objections or letter 
of Facts), and settlement submissions that have been withdrawn.
The main issue concerning this rule is to assess whether the tempo-
rary exemption from disclosure applies also pending an appeal, since the 
directive did not focus on this particular aspect. Given that a competition 
authority may have to reopen an investigation after a successful appeal, it 
seems credible that a temporary exemption from disclosure should be con-
sidered to apply throughout the entire appeal procedures until the compe-
tition authority’s decision has become final.
once the competition authority has closed its proceedings, the disclo-
sure of information should still be subject to the general requirement of 
proportionality as embodied in articles 5(3) and 6(4) of the directive. The 
proportionality test applicable in relation to evidence included in the file of 
a competition authority involves: the specificity of the request with regard 
to the nature, subject matter or contents of documents submitted to a com-
petition authority or held in the file thereof; the destination of the evidence 
to an action for damages before a national court; and the need to safeguard 
the effectiveness of the public enforcement of competition law.
1.5. The white list: no exemption from disclosure
article 6(9) provides for a general rule of disclosure of evidence included in 
the file of a competition authority, defining by default the so-called “white 
list”: the evidence that does not fall in any of the categories qualifying for 
absolute or temporary exemption from disclosure may be the subject of an 
order for disclosure by national courts at any time. This category of infor-
mation includes pre-existing information, even if submitted in the context 
of a leniency or immunity application. With regard to the disclosure of 
documents attached by the leniency applicant to the leniency statement, 
proceedings by adopting a decision or otherwise. This rule tends to guarantee consistency between 
the proceeding before the competition authority and the civil proceeding for damages, taking 
into account the binding effect of the final decisions adopted by the competition authority. See 
Fabio Ferraro, “l’esibizione e l’utilizzo delle prove del fascicolo dell’autorità garante della concor-
renza”, in Il Risarcimento del Danno nel Diritto della Concorrenza, ed. Pietro Manzini (torino: 
Giappichelli, 2017), 57.
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the directive lacks an ad hoc rule, hence, it seems that they should follow 
the general rule set out in article 6(9).16
obviously, even for that category of information, the general rules on 
proportionality of the disclosure and the specificity of the disclosure 
request apply.
1.6. Use restrictions
in order to prevent the abuse of the right to obtain the disclosure of evi-
dence, the damages directive provides for some use restrictions imposed 
on parties that obtained evidence through access to a competition author-
ity’s file (article 7). Thus, evidence falling within the scope of the absolute 
exemption from disclosure, and which is obtained solely through access 
to the file of a competition authority, is deemed inadmissible or otherwise 
protected under applicable national rules. The same rule is valid for evi-
dence falling within the scope of the temporary exemption from disclosure 
but only until the competition authority has closed its proceedings. lastly, 
evidence which is obtained by a natural or legal person solely through 
access to the file of a competition authority and which does not fall under 
the two above-mentioned categories, can be used in an action for damages 
only by that person or by a natural or legal person that succeeded to that 
person’s rights, including a person that acquired that person’s claim.
1.7. Penalty provisions
Finally, article 8 provides for penalties that national courts have to impose 
on parties, third parties and their legal representatives in case of violation 
or abuse of the right to obtain the disclosure of evidence. in particular, 
penalties have to be imposed: in case of failure or refusal to comply with 
the disclosure order of any national court; in the event of destruction of 
relevant evidence when “a claim for damages is initiated or […] an inves-
tigation by a competition authority is started” (recital No. 33); in case of 
failure or refusal to comply with the obligations imposed by a national 
court order protecting confidential information; and when there is a 
breach of the limits on the use of evidence provided for in the directive. 
16 Cristina lo Surdo, “Programmi di leniency, accesso e divulgazione nel giudizio civile alla luce 
della direttiva sul danno antitrust”, 4, http://www.osservatorioantitrust.eu/it/programmi-di-
leniency-accesso-e-divulgazione-nel-giudizio-civile-alla-luce-della-recente-direttiva-sul-danno-
antitrust/.
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Even though Member States have freedom in determining what pen-
alty to apply in relation to breaches of the disclosure requirements, the 
directive prescribes that the penalties shall include the possibility “to 
draw adverse inferences, such as presuming an issue to be proven or dis-
missing claims or defences in whole or in part, and the possibility to order 
the payment of costs” (article 8(2)).
2. A focus on the disclosure of leniency statements and settlement 
submissions 
2.1. The case law before the entry into force of the Damages Directive
The rationale behind article 6(6) – that provides for the absolute exemp-
tion from disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions 
– is obviously to safeguard the attractiveness of these two tools, avoiding 
that the participants to a cartel, influenced by the possibility of an action 
for damages, may desist from cooperating with the antitrust authority.17 
Hence, the European legislator preferred to unconditionally safeguard 
the effectiveness of public antitrust enforcement rather than the interest of 
the person who suffered a harm that may want to bring an action for dam-
ages having access to the documents related to a leniency or settlement 
programme.
on the contrary, this was not the case for the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU), which has always been careful in balancing the interests at stake.
in fact, in June 2011, in its judgment Pfleiderer,18 the Court of Justice 
(ECJ) ruled on a case concerning the refusal of a national competition 
authority to grant the access to the complete case-file, including the leni-
ency documents. The Court held that a person who has been affected by 
an infringement of EU competition law and is seeking to obtain damages 
must not be precluded from being granted access to documents relating 
to a leniency procedure involving the perpetrator of that infringement. 
However, the courts and tribunals of the Member States, on the basis of 
their national law, have to determine the conditions under which such 
access must be permitted or refused by weighing the interests protected 
by EU law.19 in particular, they have to weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the 
respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour 
17 Ferraro, “l’esibizione”, 55.
18 Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389.
19 Ibid., paragraph 32.
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of the protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant 
for leniency.20 However, Member States must exercise that competence in 
accordance with the limits established by EU law: they must not render the 
implementation of EU law impossible or excessively difficult and must not 
jeopardise the effective application of antitrust rules.21
Then, in december 2011, in its judgment CDC Hydrogene Peroxide,22 the 
General Court (GC) concluded that the interest of an undertaking which 
took part in a cartel in avoiding actions for damages cannot be regarded 
as a commercial interest and does not constitute, in any event, an interest 
deserving of protection under regulation 1049/2001, having regard to the 
individual’s right to a compensation for damages caused by anti-compet-
itive conducts.23 For this reason, the GC annulled the Commission’s deci-
sion refusing full access to the statement of contents of a case-file, which 
can potentially allow the applicant to identify the documents that could be 
useful for the purposes of a damages action.
Moreover, in 2012, in EnBW Energie,24 the GC again annulled a 
Commission’s decision refusing access to documents included in a case-
file. in this case, the alleged victim of a cartel sought access to several docu-
ments including the leniency statement, evidence provided by the leniency 
applicant, internal documents and elements seized during the inspections. 
according to the GC, the Commission’s refusal was based essentially, and 
without a case-by-case assessment, on a possible adverse impact on its leni-
ency programme, preventing it from carrying out its enforcement tasks 
efficiently.25 
The Commission appealed to the ECJ,26 which set aside the judgment 
of the GC and applied the general presumption that the disclosure of 
20 Ibid., paragraphs 30 and 31.
21 Ibid., paragraph 24. Bruno Nascimbene, “l’interazione tra programmi di clemenza e azioni di 
risarcimento nel diritto antitrust comunitario: prospettive in tema di collective redress”, Diritto 
dell’Unione Europea 4 (2012), 731.
22 Judgment of 15 december 2011, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide Cartel Damage Claims (CDC 
Hydrogene Peroxide) v. European Commission, t-437/08, EU:t:2011:752.
23 Ibid., paragraph 49.
24 Judgment od 22 May 2012, EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG v. European Commission, 
t-344/08, EU:t:2012:242.
25 Ibid., paragraph 72.
26 Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v. EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, 
C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112. See Yves Botteman, “access to dG Competition’s files through the 
transparency regulation: an uphill battle for cartel damage claimants”, 2014, 2, http://www.step-
toe.com/resources-detail-9463.html. 
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documents included in a proceeding under article 101 tFEU undermine 
the protection of commercial interests and the purpose of investigations.27 
according to the ECJ, only in this way regulation 1049/2001 would be 
applied in accordance with regulations 1/2003 and 773/2004,28 which 
“do not provide a right of access to the file for third parties other than 
complainants”.29 The ECJ believes that the interest of bringing an action 
for damages is not a superior interest within the meaning of article 4(2) of 
regulation 1049/2001,30 therefore any person seeking compensation must 
prove “that it is necessary for that person to be granted access to docu-
ments in the Commission’s file, in order to enable the latter to weigh up, on 
a case-by-case basis, the respective interests in favour of disclosure of such 
documents and in favour of the protection of those documents, taking into 
account all the relevant factors in the case”.31 However, EnBW has failed to 
show in what way access to all the documents relating to the proceeding in 
question is necessary for that purpose on the basis that there is an overrid-
ing public interest in disclosure of the documents under article 4(2) and 
(3) of regulation 1049/2001.32 Therefore, the ECJ rejected the plea.
actually, before the ECJ ruled in February 2014 on the appeal in the 
EnBW Energie case, in June 2013 it gave another judgment in line with 
the previous ones (Pfleiderer, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide and EnBW Energie 
first instance judgment). The judgment in question is Donau Chemie,33 in 
which the ECJ reaffirmed what was said in Pfleiderer and added that: “it is 
only if there is a risk that a given document may actually undermine the 
public interest relating to the effectiveness of the national leniency pro-
gramme that non-disclosure of that document may be justified”.34 in any 
other case, the case-by-case weighing-up is necessary because any rule that 
27 Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v. EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, 
C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraphs 80, 81, and 93.
28 Ibid., paragraphs 92, 93 and 94.  in fact, regulations Nos. 1049/2001 and 1/2003 do not contain 
a provision expressly giving one regulation primacy over the other, so it is necessary to ensure 
that each of the regulations is applied in a manner which is compatible with the other and enables 
them to be applied consistently (see Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v. EnBW 
Energie Baden-Württemberg AG, C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 84). 
29 Ibid., paragraph 94. 
30 Ibid., paragraph 108.
31 Ibid., paragraph 107.
32 Ibid., paragraph 132.
33 Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and Others, C-536/11, 
EU:C:2013:366.
34 Ibid., paragraph 48.
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is rigid, either by providing for absolute refusal to grant access to the docu-
ments in question or for granting access to those documents as matter of 
course, is liable to undermine the effective application of articles 101 and 
102 tFEU.35
in 2014, in the Schenker judgment,36 the GC confirmed the position 
adopted by the ECJ in EnBW Energie. This time, the undertaking Schenker 
requested, principally, the disclosure of the entire case-file relating to the 
proceedings or, in the alternative, of the full text of the airfreight deci-
sion and, in the further alternative, of the non-confidential version of that 
decision.37 again the Commission invoked regulations 1049/2001, 1/2003 
and 773/2004 to avoid the disclosure. The Court held that the disclosure of 
that information “could dissuade potential leniency applicants from mak-
ing statements under those notices. indeed they could find themselves in 
a less favourable position than that of other undertakings which partici-
pated in the cartel and which did not cooperate with the investigation or 
which cooperated to a lesser extent”.38 Therefore, the Court applied the 
general presumption that the disclosure of documents gathered by the 
Commission undermines, in principle, both the protection of the purpose 
of inspections, investigations and audits of the institutions of the European 
Union and the protection of the commercial interests of the undertakings 
involved in such a procedure.39
2.2. Comments
indeed, the damages directive, by categorically exempting leniency state-
ments and settlement submissions from disclosure, contradicts the CJEU’s 
rulings in Pfleiderer,40 Donau Chemie41 and EnBW Energie (first instance 
judgment), which required national courts to balance interests on a case-by-
case basis when assessing the scope of disclosure. However, the Pfleiderer 
and Donau Chemie judgments based the national court’s competence to 
conduct a balancing exercise on the “absence of EU rules governing the 
35 Ibid., paragraphs 31-34. 
36 Judgment of 7 october 2014, Schenker AG v. European Commission, t-534/11, EU:t:2014:854.
37 Ibid., paragraph 2.
38 Ibid., paragraph 56.
39 Ibid., paragraphs 57, 85, 92-94 and 113-117.
40 Judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389, para-
graph 31.
41 Judgment of 6 June 2013, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and Others, C-536/11, 
EU:C:2013:366, paragraph 43.
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disclosure of documents for the purpose of antitrust damages actions”.42 
Now, thanks to the entry into force of the damages directive, there are 
EU rules governing the disclosure of documents for the purpose of anti-
trust damages actions that include the categorical exemption of leniency 
statements and settlement submissions from disclosure. For this reason, it 
seems that the directive is inspired by the more recent judgments Schenker 
and EnBW Energie (appeal judgment) that apply the general presumption 
that the disclosure of documents included in a proceeding under article 
101 tFEU undermines the protection of commercial interests and the pur-
pose of investigations, thus, more in general, such a disclosure weakens 
public antitrust enforcement.
anyway, the ECJ has never been as strict as the European legislator in 
the directive, because it left (both in Schenker and EnBW Energie) the pos-
sibility to any person seeking compensation to prove the necessity to be 
granted access to documents in the Commission’s file, in order to enable 
the Commission to weigh up, on a case-by-case basis, the respective inter-
ests in favour of disclosure of such documents and in favour of the protec-
tion of those documents.43 on the contrary, the European legislator goes 
further by exempting tout court from disclosure leniency statements and 
settlement submissions.
2.3. The case law after the entry into force of the Damages Directive
at this point, one might think that the CJEU’s case law has changed after 
the entry into force of the damages directive, since it has had to deal with 
the new rule established in article 6(6), which provides for an absolute 
exemption from disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submis-
sions. instead, this did not happen.
in July 2015, the GC gave a ruling on a case of disclosure of evidence 
included in the file of a competition authority. at issue in the Axa 
Versicherung judgment44 there was the request for access to the complete 
versions of the table of contents and a set of documents included in a 
Commission’s case-file, based on the intention to seek compensation. The 
GC reaffirmed that it was open to the Commission to rely on the general 
42 Ibid., paragraph 25.
43 See Judgment of 27 February 2014, European Commission v. EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg 
AG, C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112, paragraph 107, and Judgment of 7 october 2014, Schenker AG v. 
European Commission, t-534/11, EU:t:2014:854, paragraph 95.
44 Judgment of 7 July 2015, Axa Versicherung AG v. European Commission, t-677/13, EU:t:2015:473.
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presumption developed by the case law set out above in order to decide to 
refuse the request.45 However, the Commission needed to establish whether 
the general considerations were in fact applicable to the document asked 
to be disclosed.46 The GC also confirmed that “[a]lthough […] [Pfleiderer 
and donau Chemie] case-law concerns leniency programmes established 
by national competition authorities, the same reasoning may be applied, 
by analogy, to the leniency programme of the Commission”.47 Then, the 
GC added that only if there was a risk that a given document may actu-
ally undermine the public interest relating to the effectiveness of the leni-
ency programme in question that non-disclosure of that document may be 
justified, therefore the Commission or the national courts “must refrain 
from taking an inflexible and absolute stance liable to undermine either 
the effective application of the competition rules by the public authori-
ties entrusted with ensuring their observance or the effective exercise of 
individuals’ rights flowing from these rules”.48 For this reason, they must 
weigh up, on a case-by-case basis, the different interests in favour of disclo-
sure and in favour of the protection of the documents in question.
Finally, the GC touched the issue of the compatibility of public and pri-
vate interests with the rule set out in article 6(6) of the directive. First of 
all, the GC said that the case law recognised the value of the leniency pro-
gramme, “but at the same time points out that the public interest in pre-
serving its effectiveness cannot be considered to take precedence, in a gen-
eral and absolute way, over the other public and private interests at stake, 
which are also worthy of protection and must be reconciled with it on a 
case-by-case basis”.49 Then, it added that recital No. 20 and article 6(2) of 
the directive expressly state that this directive is without prejudice to the 
rules on public access to documents laid down in regulation 1049/2001.50
on its first occasion of applying the rule set out in article 6(6) of the 
damages directive, the Court preferred to bypass the problem and the 
only justification for such a behaviour is that the case Axa Versicherung 
concerned the disclosure of a table of contents with references to leniency 
documents and not leniency documents themselves.
45 Ibid., paragraph 95.
46 Ibid., paragraphs 94 and 97.  
47 Ibid., paragraph 118.
48 Ibid., paragraphs 122 and 123.
49 Ibid., paragraph 135.
50 Ibid., paragraphs 58 and 135.
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So far, no other cases in which the article 6(6) should be applied have 
been submitted to the court. 
However, in March 2017, the ECJ gave a judgment on another important 
aspect of the issue at stake: the Evonik Degussa judgment on the publi-
cation of information in a Commission decision finding an infringement 
of article 101 tFEU.51 in this occasion the Court held that the case law 
formulated on the basis of regulation 1049/2001, under which it acknowl-
edged that there was a general presumption capable of justifying the 
refusal to disclose the documents in a file relating to a proceeding under 
article 101 tFEU, must not be transposed to the publication of decisions 
on infringements of article 101 tFEU.52 in fact, the publication, in the 
form of verbatim quotations, of information from the documents pro-
vided by an undertaking to the Commission differs from the publication 
of verbatim quotations from that statement itself. “Whereas the first type 
of publication should be authorised, subject to compliance with the pro-
tection owed, in particular, to business secrets, professional secrecy and 
other confidential information, the second type of publication is not per-
mitted in any circumstances”.53 Consequently, article 6(6) of the damages 
directive is properly not mentioned at all.
interestingly, however, advocate General (aG) Szpunar54 makes a dif-
ference between leniency statements and factual information, thus, in 
his mind, “the fact that the leniency statements are afforded full protec-
tion does not mean that the same level of protection must be afforded to 
the factual information concerning the infringement contained in those 
statements when the Commission’s decisions are published”.55 in fact, he 
believes that a fundamental element of actions for damages is the public 
access to the information relating to the unlawful facts, “since it allows 
injured third parties to ascertain the course taken by the cartel and facili-
tates the establishment of the facts relating to the existence and the extent 
of liability, with respect to all the participants”.56 indeed, the delicate bal-
ance between public and private enforcement established by the damages 
51 Judgment of 14 March 2017, Evonik Degussa GmbH v. European Commission, C-162/15 P, 
EU:C:2017:205.
52 Ibid., paragraphs 77 and 79.
53 Ibid., paragraphs 87 and 97.
54 opinion of aG Szpunar in Case C-162/15P, Evonik Degussa GmbH v. European Commission, 
EU:C:2016:587.
55 Ibid., paragraph 204.
56 Ibid., paragraph 204.
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directive could be upset if the absolute protection afforded to leniency 
statements is extended to information relating to the unlawful facts con-
tained in those statements. Therefore, aG Szpunar concludes that: “such 
a wide protection of the leniency documents cannot be inferred from 
directive 2014/104, in the absence of any express provision to that effect”.57
3. Conclusion
one of the reasons why the damages directive has been adopted is to rem-
edy the absence of EU rules governing the disclosure of documents for the 
purpose of antitrust damages actions and it created a two-pillar system, 
based on both public and private enforcement, even though it still remains 
focused on the first one: the key rules are, in fact, those on the access to 
information held by the competition authorities and on the binding effect 
of their decisions for the national courts.
The most relevant issue in the field of disclosure of evidence arises from 
the need for an interaction between public and private enforcement, since 
the disclosure of evidence – especially of that contained in leniency or set-
tlement’s case-files – could jeopardise the application of competition rules 
by antitrust authorities. 
While the rule on the right to obtain the disclosure of evidence con-
tained in the damages directive, together with the provisions on disclo-
sure of documents contained in the grey list and in the white list, strike a 
fair balance between public and private enforcement and facilitate victims 
of antitrust violations in bringing actions for damages, the same thing 
cannot be affirmed for provisions on disclosure of documents contained 
in the black list. 
indeed, the disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submis-
sions is a very delicate matter, therefore, even before the entry into force of 
the damages directive, the CJEU dealt with this topic several times and it 
has always been cautious, by affirming that it is necessary to weigh up, on 
a case-by-case basis, the respective interests in favour of disclosure of such 
documents and those in favour of their protection.
Now, thanks to the entry into force of the damages directive, there is a 
legislative parameter (article 6(6)) that the CJEU has to take into account 
when deciding in cases on disclosure of evidence contained in leniency or 
settlement case-files, therefore its jurisprudence on this topic is supposed 
57 Ibid., paragraph 205.
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to change, since a very strict rule has been introduced. The weighing up 
on a case-by-case basis is not permitted anymore. However, so far, the 
Court has not yet ruled on the matter, even though it had the opportunity 
to do so.
indeed, a more balanced solution than the one adopted by the CJEU of 
the weighing up of the interests on a case-by-case basis is not conceivable; 
it seems the only method in order not to favour public enforcement over 
private enforcement or vice versa. instead, the European legislator has 
preferred to unconditionally protect the efficiency of leniency and settle-
ment programmes to the detriment of parties that suffered a harm which 
have to find any possible way to support their damage claim, in a context 
in which the information asymmetry and the difficulty of the factual and 
economic analysis are evident.
it seems that, with this particular provision contained in article 6(6), 
the European legislator did not succeed in its goal of making it easier for 
victims of antitrust violations to claim compensation from the offender, 
which is the general aim of the damages directive. in fact, not having 
the possibility to have access to leniency statements or settlement submis-
sion in stand-alone actions, it is highly difficult to prove that they suffered 
harm. Therefore, victims can only wait until the competition authority 
adopts a final infringement decision in order to start a probably successful 
follow-on action.58
overall, all provisions on disclosure of documents contained in directive 
2014/104/EU contribute to make a big step forward in the private enforce-
ment sector, except for the provisions contained in article 6(6), which 
could have probably been less rigid.
58 in fact, according to article 9(1) of the damages directive, the final decision adopted in accord-
ance with articles 101 and 102 tFEU or with national competition law by a NCa, or the final deci-
sion rendered by a court of appeal are considered irrefutable proof of the infringement in follow-on 
actions. Therefore, the existence of the damage will be surely recognised by the judge ruling in the 
action for damages, whereas the amount of the damage will be evaluated by the same judge, even 
though it could also be null. However, under article 9(2) of the directive, the binding effect is 
not recognised to a decision of a NCa of another Member State, different from the one where the 
claim for compensation has been promoted. This means that the person seeking compensation has 
very few possibilities, firstly because they cannot have access to leniency or settlement documents, 
secondly because the judge can also assess that there is no infringement and subsequently no com-
pensation. on this point, see Claudia Massa, “The effects of decisions adopted by Competition 
authorities in the framework of directive 2014/104/EU: Criticalities and future prospects”, in 60 
years of EU Competition Law: Stocktaking and future prospects, ed. roberto Mastroianni, amedeo 
arena (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2017), 126-128.
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a possible objection to this conclusion could be that a less rigid rule – 
for instance, the one of the weighing up on a case-by-case basis suggested 
by the CJEU – might discourage undertakings belonging to a cartel from 
cooperating with the antitrust authorities: in fact, they would be aware 
that, even though in principle what they confess will not be disclosed, at a 
later time the Court could order the disclosure of evidence included in the 
leniency programme, considering more appropriate to protect the victim’s 
interests.
This is partially true. indeed, it is true that the undertaking, participat-
ing to a leniency programme, would risk that its confessions may be dis-
closed (with all the subsequent consequences, such as the negative influ-
ence on the company’s reputation, the potential simultaneous violation of 
other laws, the private antitrust lawsuits that might follow, etc.),59 but it 
is also true that the same undertaking, deciding to collaborate with the 
authority, will benefit from a whole host of advantages. in fact, accord-
ing to the European leniency policy, if a company which participated in 
a cartel is the first one to inform the Commission of an undetected cartel 
by providing sufficient information to allow the Commission to launch 
an inspection at the premises of the companies allegedly involved in the 
cartel, it will obtain total immunity. on the other hand, companies which 
do not qualify for immunity may benefit from a reduction of fines if they 
provide evidence that represents significant added value to that already in 
the Commission’s possession and have terminated their participation in 
the cartel. The first company to meet these conditions is granted 30 to 50% 
reduction, the second 20 to 30% and subsequent companies up to 20%.60
Hence, it is a risk assessment that the company will have to deal with.
it should not be forgotten that a rule like the one contained in article 
6(6) highly protects companies that breached the law and who are also 
59 amedeo arena, “Game theory as a yardstick for antitrust leniency policy: The US, EU, and 
italian experiences in a comparative perspective”, Global Jurist 11, no.1 (2011), 1935-1936. 
60 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html. National systems could dif-
fer from the European one. For instance, the italian scheme, as amended in 2013, provides that 
all undertakings that do not qualify for full immunity but provide the italian antitrust authority 
with valuable evidence can be granted a fine reduction which, as a rule, should not exceed 50% of 
the applicable sanction. Therefore, the italian system links the discount percentage to the value of 
the evidence provided and not to chronological priority. The consolidated text of the italian reso-
lution on non-imposition and reduction of sanctions is available at: http://www.agcm.it/rating-
di-legalita/107-concorrenza/intese-e-abusi/6571-comunicazione-sulla-non-imposizione-e-sulla-
riduzione-delle-sanzioni-ai-sensi-dellarticolo-15-della-legge-10-ottobre-1990-n-287.html. For a 
comparison of leniency policy in the US, EU and italy, see arena, “Game theory”, 1938-1941.
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being offered the possibility to benefit of reduction of fines, even though all 
in the name of the right functioning of the market. is it not the case to mit-
igate such protection, so much unbalanced towards public enforcement, 
and to take more into account victims of illegal behaviours? if article 6(6) 
were less rigid, the Commission and the NCas would still retain the role 
of effective competition law enforcers, although their work could become 
more difficult, as the number of applications of leniency programmes 
could certainly decrease.
Therefore, the real issue is the following: how much can the effective-
ness of private enforcement in stand-alone actions be sacrificed in order to 
protect public enforcement? if we considered the possibility for victims of 
violations of competition law to propose only probably successful follow-
on actions (only after the infringement decision adopted by the antitrust 
authority has become final) sufficient, then article 6 (6) could be consid-
ered efficient, especially since the provision of a clear, although rigid, rule 
is a value in itself, as it guarantees legal certainty and predictability of the 
consequences of participating in a leniency programme. if, on the con-
trary, the legislator wants to give those victims the chance to obtain dam-
ages already in stand-alone actions, then article 6(6) should be amended 
and made less rigid.
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